Hacker elites: how the most dangerous APT groups operate

Key environments of cyber operations

Attacks don’t happen in a vacuum. Hacker groups carefully choose the environment in which they operate — and each of these environments comes with different demands, unique vulnerabilities, and specific types of risk. Attacking a data center is very different from targeting a power plant. The more sensitive the target, the more calculated and sophisticated the attack tends to be.

Targets of APT groups

Their objective might be a classified document, a technology with military potential, or insight into an enemy’s strategic decision-making. Their missions are neither chaotic nor random. These are strategically orchestrated operations with long-term goals:

STONE PANDA, directly Linked to the Chinese State. Stone Panda doesn’t aim to sabotage — its mission is silent data collection. The group exists to secure access to technological innovations and industrial data deemed strategically important to China. Its most notorious operation, Cloud Hopper (2017), saw the group infiltrate hundreds of companies and institutions worldwide by compromising IT service providers. This gave it access not only to commercial data, but also to sensitive government and military information. Targets included cloud infrastructure, data centers, and strategic technology sectors. Stone Panda also turned its focus to healthcare — in 2016 and 2017, it launched multiple attacks on pharmaceutical companies and research institutions, stealing data on drug development and biotechnology. It deployed RedLeaves malware, designed to remain undetected for years. Stone Panda’s operations are quiet and low-noise, making them highly effective — and dangerous.​

TURLA, under Russian command, is known for its philosophy of persistence. Each of its operations is part of a broader strategic plan focused on political and military espionage. The group specializes in infiltrating government offices, defense organizations, and embassies, primarily targeting Europe and the Middle East. In 2014, it successfully attacked NATO networks and several European government agencies. TURLA is characterized by sophisticated use of custom malware such as Snake (Uroburos), Gazer, and Kazuar, which enable long-term access to compromised systems with minimal risk of detection. This long-term infiltration is key to its strategy, inspired by the symbol of the Uroboros — a snake eating its own tail. One example is the Turla Watering Hole operation from 2014, in which TURLA used compromised websites aimed at African diplomats to infiltrate their networks and collect sensitive information. Another was Operation Agent BTZ, which targeted the U.S. military and its internal systems, leading to the exposure of classified military documents. TURLA also used the “web shell” technique to infiltrate and spread malware via compromised web servers. The group doesn’t attack for immediate gain, but to achieve broader geopolitical goals and military dominance.​

FANCY BEAR is a predator that doesn’t roar — it crosses borders silently. Backed by Russia’s military intelligence agency GRU, its hunting ground includes political institutions, election systems, and military servers across the West. Fancy Bear doesn’t steal money — it steals trust, stability, and sometimes even election results. Its most visible footprint came in 2016, during the U.S. presidential election, when it breached the Democratic National Committee’s email accounts and leaked sensitive communications. But that was only the beginning. It meddled in French elections, infiltrated the German Bundestag, and targeted NATO structures. Its style? Silent infiltration — military discipline in digital form. It doesn’t need noise when it can quietly harvest data for months. Fancy Bear uses tailored phishing campaigns and tools like X-Agent, allowing it to stay inside systems as long as needed — or until something explodes. Fancy Bear is more than just a hacker group. It’s a geopolitical instrument. If trust in elections collapses, political talks fall apart, or secret documents leak — look into the shadows. You might find bear tracks there.

LAZARUS is like a deep-sea octopus — calm, yet everywhere. Its tentacles stretch from banks in Bangladesh to crypto exchanges in Japan. The group functions as the cyber banking vault of the North Korean regime: it steals, destroys, and funds the country’s nuclear program. In 2016, it nearly drained the Bangladeshi Central Bank’s account at the U.S. Federal Reserve — only a typo in one transaction prevented a billion-dollar loss. In 2017, it unleashed the devastating WannaCry ransomware, crippling hospitals, businesses, and transport systems across more than 150 countries. Lazarus strikes as a unified group, but each tentacle has its own specialization: espionage, ransomware, network intrusions, and supply chain abuse. It targets crypto exchanges, banks, developers — anywhere money or sensitive data flows. Unlike other APT groups, Lazarus doesn’t hide its motives. It needs money — for the state, for the military, for the regime’s survival. That’s why it doesn’t hesitate to destroy systems, loot critical infrastructure, or attack nuclear programs.

CHARMING KITTEN is a group that relies more on deception and manipulation than brute-force intrusions. Instead of malware, it uses fake identities, trust, and psychology — like a cat that first wins attention before showing its claws. The group often impersonates journalists, academics, or cybersecurity researchers to lure its targets — dissidents, journalists, researchers, or government employees — into opening phishing emails or visiting fake login pages. Its goal is long-term access to emails, calendars, and communications that the Iranian regime can use to suppress opposition or monitor foreign relations. In 2018, it compromised accounts of members of the Chatham House think tank and several U.S. universities. It also targeted U.S. government employees using convincing phishing pages mimicking Google or Microsoft. The group attempted to breach presidential campaign emails in the U.S. (2020) and sent fake invitations to UN conferences. Charming Kitten may not be the most technically sophisticated group, but its ability to reach sensitive data through trust and illusion makes it one of the most dangerous players in Iranian cyber espionage.